> ## Content Index > Fetch the complete content index at: https://www.battlepolicy.com/llms.txt > Use this file to discover other available public pages before exploring further. # Fedorov Takes Ukraine's Defense-Tech Playbook Private With Karp's Backing - URL: https://www.battlepolicy.com/fedorov-takes-ukraines-defense-tech-playbook-private-with-karps-backing/ - Published: 2026-09-04T03:37:15.000Z - Updated: 2026-09-04T03:37:15.000Z - Description: The ousted defense minister has found American capital for his procurement-and-data model while Kyiv's own export channel has issued no permits and charges 20% to 30% up front. - Author: Marcus Schuler - Tags: Ukraine, USA, Funding, #analysis, Mykhailo Fedorov, Alex Karp, Palantir, Brave1, Resolution 875 *The ousted defense minister has found American capital for his procurement-and-data model while Kyiv's own export channel has issued no permits and charges 20% to 30% up front.* ## Aug. 31 at Palantir's Washington office Mykhailo Fedorov's Sept. 1 announcement reconstitutes the procurement-and-data playbook he ran inside Ukraine's Defense Ministry as a private company backed by American money. His press office named Palantir CEO Alex Karp as the first lead investor but disclosed neither the size of the investment nor the company's name or planned technologies. The announcement came seven weeks after Fedorov left the ministry, and while Ukraine's own legal channel for exporting combat-proven technology, Resolution No. 875, has yet to clear a single permit. Fedorov and Karp met Aug. 31 at Palantir's Washington office, where they recorded the announcement video. "We've worked together for a half decade," [Karp said](https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/09/01/ousted-ukrainian-defense-chief-lands-palantir-ceo-as-first-investor-in-new-venture/?ref=battlepolicy.com). "You and your colleagues are launching a company that I think will be defining for the world, bringing your knowledge and acumen about the art of war, as a product to allied countries." Karp had called soon after the July dismissal became public and proposed that "we do something together," Fedorov told reporters at the time. "During the full-scale war, our team gained unique experience working with defense technologies in Ukraine," Fedorov said in his statement, adding that "Ukraine will be the priority for me." His press office said further stages of cooperation with Palantir would be announced gradually. Palantir did not answer CNBC's request for comment, which leaves Karp's backing confirmed and Palantir's corporate role open. Frequently Asked Questions What did Mykhailo Fedorov announce on Sept. 1? A new defense-technology company with Palantir CEO Alex Karp as its first lead investor, per Fedorov's press office. The company's name, products and the size of Karp's investment were not disclosed. Is Palantir itself investing? Only Karp's backing has been confirmed. Palantir did not respond to CNBC's request for comment, and Fedorov's press office said further stages of cooperation with Palantir would be announced gradually. How is the company different from Fedorov's defense-tech fund? The fund, which Fedorov described to the Financial Times as "not exactly a classic venture fund," is meant to invest in Ukrainian startups and build new ones around battlefield robotics, jet-drone interceptors and low-cost AI-enabled missiles. The company will build technologies itself. Neither has disclosed committed capital or a domicile. What is Resolution No. 875? Ukraine's wartime arms-export procedure, adopted July 1 and in force from July 8\. It offers a 30-day review for partner states but charges an up-front fee of 20% on finished products and technology and 30% on components, per Palisade Bergschrund's reading of the text. Has anything been exported under it? No permits had been issued under Resolution No. 875 as of Aug. 26, and the industry had secured no more than 10 small export contracts since controlled exports reopened, according to Ihor Fedirko of the Ukrainian Council of Defence Industry. Ministry revisions were expected in early September. AI-generated summary, reviewed by an editor. [More on our AI guidelines](https://www.battlepolicy.com/ai-guidelines/). Below this point - Six months at the ministry - The fund and the company - The July 15 rupture - Resolution No. 875 and zero permits - Karp's capital - What to watch in early September ## Six months at the ministry The company's strongest disclosed asset is not a named weapon. It is the method Fedorov applied at the ministry from Jan. 14 until July 15: open competition, direct ordering by combat units, and operational data fed back into software and procurement. [DefPulse](https://defpulse.news/en/six-months-of-fedorov-at-the-ministry-of-defense-what-was-promised-what-was-done-what-was-left-unfinished/?ref=battlepolicy.com) found in early August that several of those mechanisms kept running after he left. Fedorov's ministry moved drone tenders away from named models and toward tactical and technical specifications. Competition among six makers of 155 mm ammunition cut the expected contract value by 16%, and a transparent tender for 5,000 pickup trucks saved more than UAH 1 billion, per DefPulse's review of the ministry's record. An audit uncovered UAH 300 billion in overspending and violations, according to media accounts the outlet cited. NATO agreed for the first time to give the Defense Procurement Agency direct financial and expert support through the UK Special Adviser's Office. DOT-Chain Defence shortened the distance between front-line demand and a purchase order. In May, five Drone Line units received budgets to order drones and electronic-warfare systems directly, and they placed UAH 184.8 million in orders in less than two weeks, UAH 40.8 million of it funded promptly. The system treated units as customers choosing against a specification rather than as recipients of centrally selected equipment. The data layer made that purchasing model more valuable. Brave1 Dataroom, a joint Defense Ministry and Palantir project launched earlier in 2026, runs on Palantir infrastructure and lets Ukrainian companies train AI models on real combat data, including target detection against Shahed-type drones, Defense News documented. Palantir's software is deployed across more than half a dozen Ukrainian agencies. [Delta](https://www.battlepolicy.com/delta/) supplies the operational counterpart, combining drone feeds, radar and field data in one battlefield-management environment. Outgoing U.S. Army Secretary Dan Driscoll told the Senate in May that Delta was "absolutely incredible" while U.S. Army systems remained "compartmentalized, isolated and ineffective against modern threats." Fedorov attached battlefield claims to the process: mandatory Air Force debriefs after mass attacks, he said, helped raise cruise-missile interception from 47% to 87% and [Shahed](https://www.battlepolicy.com/shahed-136/) interception from 83% to 91%. Those figures remain his own, unaudited. ## The fund and the company Fedorov is raising a separate defense-technology fund alongside the company. It is "not exactly a classic venture fund," he told the Financial Times on Aug. 30\. Its initial priorities are battlefield robotics, high-speed interceptor drones against Russia's jet-powered attack drones, and low-cost AI-enabled missiles. Ukraine had already tested high-speed interceptors for that threat, he said, and could produce them at scale with more investment. He also offered to help the United States "build an army of drones" in exchange for Patriot interceptors. "I'm ready to make that trade," Fedorov told the FT. It is a personal proposal, not an agreement, and he no longer holds an office that could negotiate it. On Aug. 28 he agreed to advise Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto on defense innovation, remotely and without pay. The company will build technologies, according to Fedorov's announcement; the fund is meant to invest in Ukrainian startups and create new ones. Neither has disclosed committed capital, a domicile or a first transaction. ## The July 15 rupture Fedorov operates outside government because his procurement model collided with military command authority. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy removed him in the reshuffle that followed the Svyrydenko government's dismissal on July 14, after a dispute with then-Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi over who decides what gets bought and how resources move among brigades. At an early July meeting, generals accused Fedorov of "PR repackaging" existing processes and excessive "gamification" of the war, The Economist reported. Protests demanding his return ran for roughly a month. Zelenskyy replaced Syrskyi with Mykhailo Drapatyi on July 21 but did not restore Fedorov, and parliament confirmed Yevhen Khmara as defense minister on Aug. 19\. The rupture then acquired a political track: on Aug. 18 Fedorov called for wartime elections, and on Aug. 25 he told Reuters that "it looks as though we're gradually, slowly losing." An unpublished poll reviewed by The Economist placed him third at 16%, behind Zelenskyy and former commander Valerii Zaluzhnyi. Chosun Daily put the open question plainly: whether the company becomes a base for political influence outside the Zelenskyy administration. Khmara has already changed the ministry's operating emphasis. His Aug. 3 memorandum makes YouControl business-intelligence screening mandatory for every defense supplier before a contract is signed, Defence Ukraine found. His team presents the measure as protection against shell companies and Russian-linked actors; defense-technology advocates warn that it will slow contracting. ## Resolution No. 875 and zero permits Ukraine needs an export channel because its factories can build more than the state can finance. The National Security and Defense Council puts potential 2026 output at up to $55 billion, from an estimated $35 billion in 2025, against a state procurement budget that Defence Ukraine places near $10 billion and Palisade Bergschrund at about $13 billion. CASE Ukraine economist Svitlana Dovhalenko estimated in June that around 40% of capacity sits unused for lack of financing. Resolution No. 875, adopted July 1 and in force from July 8, was built to monetize that gap without depriving the front. Applications involving partner states get a 30-day review, and silence from the security services after 15 days counts as consent. The state can freeze an export it wants for itself, but it must then sign a funded procurement contract within 30 days or lose that basis for blocking the sale. The fee is steep. Palisade Bergschrund's reading of the enacted text finds an up-front, non-refundable charge of 20% of the state-set value of finished products or technology and 30% for components. Kyiv sets that value from what its own military pays for comparable equipment, so an exporter may not know the fee when it signs with a buyer. Technology stays Ukrainian-owned, and resale by a partner triggers a further 20% royalty. The result so far is a channel with no traffic. [Ihor Fedirko](https://thedefensepost.com/2026/08/26/ukraines-defense-industry-arms-exports/?ref=battlepolicy.com), executive director of the Ukrainian Council of Defence Industry, counted no permits under Resolution No. 875 as of Aug. 26, no more than 10 small export contracts since controlled exports reopened, and one operating overseas joint venture. The UAH 15 million, or $337,000, threshold excludes the small trial orders foreign customers place first, he said, and ministry revisions were expected in early September. Some firms have chosen another route: a Lawfare analysis cited by Defence Ukraine found Ukrainian companies moving intellectual property into Western jurisdictions rather than waiting on Kyiv. The model that has advanced furthest is the [Octopus-100](https://www.battlepolicy.com/octopus/) interceptor, which Ukraine licensed to the UK Ministry of Defence for serial production with an initial 8,000 units earmarked for Ukraine. ## Karp's capital Karp is buying into people and process at a moment when Resolution No. 875 prices physical systems, components and transferred technology. The investment is in his name and its size is undisclosed; no Palantir corporate stake has been announced. The distinction matters for a company whose quarterly revenue grew 93% year over year, whose valuation passed $440 billion and whose U.S. government business supplies roughly half of revenue, per Defense News. The disclosed investment is not an export application. Resolution No. 875 can charge a drone, a component or licensed know-how, but it cannot readily value a former ministry team's ability to connect front-line requirements, competitive tenders and combat data. Fedorov, himself a proponent of controlled exports, has secured capital for that organizational asset before Kyiv's regime has produced a permit or a traceable receipt. The state helped build DOT-Chain, Brave1 Dataroom and Delta, then removed the official most closely associated with joining them into a procurement model. That know-how is now being organized inside a private vehicle with a foreign lead investor, while Khmara's supplier screening and the domestic-order-first rule still govern the manufacturers who stayed. The limits of the conclusion are firm: the company's jurisdiction, products and ownership structure are unknown, as are Palantir's corporate role and whether any state data or ministry-developed technology is involved. ## What to watch in early September The first decision due is the Defense Ministry's promised revision of Resolution No. 875: what happens to the 20% to 30% fee, the UAH 15 million threshold, and the time a real application takes to clear. The first permit will say more than another capacity estimate. For Fedorov's projects, the missing facts are the company's name, domicile and first product, whether Palantir joins Karp, and the fund's first close. The next poll comparable to The Economist's 16% reading will show whether his private defense role is also widening his political base.