> ## Content Index > Fetch the complete content index at: https://www.battlepolicy.com/llms.txt > Use this file to discover other available public pages before exploring further. # Helsing's HX-2 Combat Footage Shifts the Scrutiny to the Factory - URL: https://www.battlepolicy.com/helsings-hx-2-combat-footage-shifts-the-scrutiny-to-the-factory/ - Published: 2026-09-04T16:11:47.000Z - Updated: 2026-09-04T16:11:47.000Z - Description: Ukraine's 59th Brigade says roughly four in five HX-2 launches end in successful strikes. Its complaints concern propellers, catapults and warhead size, which is an industrial problem for a company built around software. - Author: Marcus Schuler - Tags: Ukraine, Europe, Autonomy, #analysis, Helsing, HX-2, loitering munition, EURENCO, 59th Brigade, terminal guidance *Ukraine's 59th Brigade says roughly four in five* [*HX-2*](https://www.battlepolicy.com/helsing-hx-2/) *launches end in successful strikes. Its complaints concern propellers, catapults and warhead size, which is an industrial problem for a company built around software.* ## Aug. 28 With the 59th Brigade The nine-month distance between a Nov. 20, 2025 German military file that faulted Helsing's HX-2 and footage published on Aug. 28, 2026 of the drone striking Russian forces is a manufacturing and quality-control story, not an artificial-intelligence story. [UNITED24 Media](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yFeaYbCA6Bs&ref=battlepolicy.com) filmed a crew from Ukraine's 59th Brigade preparing, launching and fighting with the system. Crew commander "Spy" said about 80% of launches ended in successful strikes. That is the crew's own estimate, carried by Ukrainian state-backed media and never independently audited. The crew told UNITED24 Media it used the HX-2 against Russian logistics, ammunition deliveries and infantry transport. Spy attributed the remaining 20% of launches to a bad departure from the catapult or a lost signal, and put the crew's longest flight at 88 km. The documentary shows an HX-2 destroying a Russian multiple-launch rocket system parked away from its firing position, in a location the crew described as beyond the reach of other drones. UNITED24 Media also visited the 411th "Hawks" Regiment, where operators train on the HX-2 for a few weeks before combat missions. Some had never flown a drone. Draft IDF's Aug. 31 account repeated the documentary's figures and footage, a secondary pickup rather than independent confirmation. Frequently Asked Questions What did the 59th Brigade say about the HX-2's performance? Crew commander "Spy" told UNITED24 Media that about 80% of launches ended in successful strikes, and put the crew's longest flight at 88 km. He attributed the remaining 20% to a bad departure from the catapult or a lost signal. That is one crew's estimate, carried by Ukrainian state-backed media, not an audited rate. What is the HX-2? An electrically propelled X-wing loitering munition from Munich-based Helsing, unveiled in December 2024\. Helsing gives it up to 100 km of range, a top speed of 220 km/h and anti-tank, anti-structure and multipurpose payloads. Army Recognition puts takeoff weight at 12 kg and the maximum warhead at about 4.5 kg. How does its terminal guidance work against jamming? A trainer in the UNITED24 Media documentary explained that the operator must first lock the guidance system onto the target, including a moving one. After that lock, according to the trainer, the drone continues to impact even if the radio link is cut. Helsing says a human stays in or on the loop for critical decisions. Why did Ukraine pause HX-2 orders in January 2026? A German military presentation dated Nov. 20, 2025 and obtained by Bloomberg stated that several aircraft failed to take off in trials by Ukraine's 14th Regiment, and that some lacked components for AI terminal guidance, midcourse navigation and visual target acquisition, per The Defense Post. Helsing disputed the account and said the regiment later requested more than 1,000 additional aircraft. How large is Helsing's German order? The German outlet nd-aktuell placed it at roughly 4,300 HX-2 aircraft for about 270 million euros. STARK Defence is to supply about 2,200 Virtus systems for the same amount, and Rheinmetall's initial package covers roughly 2,500 FV-014 drones for nearly 300 million euros. Is Helsing addressing the request for a bigger warhead? Helsing and EURENCO signed a Memorandum of Understanding at Eurosatory in Paris on June 17, 2026 to develop a European Modular Explosive Warhead for the HX-2, built to French operational requirements first. Helsing's announcement cited propellant and explosives lead times of 12 to 24 months. AI-generated summary, reviewed by an editor. [More on our AI guidelines](https://www.battlepolicy.com/ai-guidelines/). Below this point - 12 Kilograms and a Terminal Handoff - The Nov. 20 File - The 59th Brigade's 20% - Ukraine's 1,526 Approvals - The June 17 Warhead Agreement - Japan's Tests Close in September ## 12 Kilograms and a Terminal Handoff The HX-2's mechanism matters more than its AI label. Helsing describes an electrically propelled X-wing loitering munition with up to 100 km of range, a top speed of 220 km/h and anti-tank, anti-structure and multipurpose payload options. Army Recognition puts takeoff weight at 12 kg and the maximum warhead at about 4.5 kg. A trainer in the UNITED24 Media documentary explained that the operator must correctly lock the guidance system onto the target, including a moving one. Once that happens, according to the trainer, the system becomes immune to interference and continues to impact even after losing its connection. [Helsing](https://www.battlepolicy.com/helsing/) likewise says a human stays in or on the loop for critical decisions while onboard software can search for, re-identify and engage a target without a continuous link. The same trainer described the HX-2 as a radio-controlled aircraft constrained by electronic warfare and the radio horizon. Terminal guidance does not abolish those constraints. It shortens the window in which they can defeat the mission: the radio link must survive long enough for the operator to acquire and lock the target, after which onboard guidance carries the aircraft home. A second performance read came from Project Flytrap 5.0 in Lithuania in June 2026\. Army Recognition counted 15 kills and two near-misses across 17 HX-2 engagements by US soldiers, in a V Corps-led exercise that assessed more than 20 systems using standardized data collection. That does not validate the 59th Brigade's estimate, but it shows the guidance chain working outside Helsing's own demonstrations. ## The Nov. 20 File The HX-2 entered 2026 with a sharply different public record. A presentation dated Nov. 20, 2025 and obtained by Bloomberg stated that several aircraft had failed to take off during Ukrainian trials. It was compiled by a unit reporting to General Gunter Schneider, appointed the previous October to lead the armed forces department at Germany's Defence Ministry. [The Defense Post](https://thedefensepost.com/2026/01/20/ukraine-pause-helsing-hx2/?ref=battlepolicy.com) identified the trial unit as Ukraine's 14th Regiment, which specializes in unmanned systems. According to the German presentation, some tested aircraft lacked components intended to provide AI terminal guidance, midcourse navigation and visual target acquisition. Bloomberg also reported that jamming near the front severed links between aircraft and operators. Ukraine paused additional orders, while Berlin did not plan to finance a follow-on purchase unless Kyiv renewed its interest. Helsing disputed that account. The company said it had no knowledge of the presentation, denied that the HX-2 suffered a high launch-failure rate and maintained that the 14th Regiment had subsequently requested more than 1,000 additional aircraft. It added that the HX-2 was listed in Ukraine's central military ordering system. "The hit rate of the first flights, which was officially documented, is encouraging," Helsing said. A German Defence Ministry spokeswoman countered that ministry management had never reviewed or approved the document. That does not erase the recorded launch failures or missing components, but it limits what the presentation can settle about the ministry's own judgment. The November trials and August footage need not cancel each other out. They involved different Ukrainian units, different sets of aircraft and nine months of separation. A 14th Regiment batch could have arrived with missing functions and poor launch reliability while later HX-2s worked well enough for a 59th Brigade crew to claim an 80% strike rate. Both descriptions fit a company increasing hardware output faster than it can consistently control configuration and tolerances. ## The 59th Brigade's 20% The 59th Brigade's own complaint list narrows the remaining problem. Its operators cited defective propellers, aircraft that failed to launch and mishaps coming off the catapult. They also wanted a larger warhead, according to UNITED24 Media. None of those complaints accused the terminal-guidance software of failing after target lock. Loss of signal accounts for part of the crew's claimed 20% failure share, but that does not by itself establish an autonomy failure. A link can break before the operator completes the handoff, which spreads the fault across communications, mission geometry and the acquisition sequence. The other failure mode is purely physical: an aircraft that leaves its launcher badly never reaches the point where its autonomy matters. That distinction cuts into Helsing's positioning. The company markets the HX-2 as software-defined and mass-producible, yet the variable exposed by combat use is industrial consistency. Software can update target recognition or mission logic over the air. It cannot fix a defective propeller or recover an aircraft that fails on the catapult. The crew's praise was similarly physical and organizational. Its operators told UNITED24 Media that Helsing provided support 24 hours a day and that instructors remained reachable around the clock. The same crew framed the competitive standard clearly: Ukraine relies mostly on domestic systems because Ukrainian manufacturers react quickly to battlefield changes and offer flexibility that foreign producers struggle to match. A foreign aircraft competes on response time as much as range. ## Ukraine's 1,526 Approvals Helsing is pushing into a market crowded by Ukrainian suppliers. Ukraine's Ministry of Defence approved 1,526 new weapons and military-equipment models during the first eight months of 2026, up from 983 in the same period of 2025, per Defence Industry Europe. Nearly 91% of the 2026 approvals came from Ukrainian industry, compared with 86% a year earlier. Unmanned aerial systems led the list, with 565 Ukrainian-made models cleared. Germany's structure is different, with contracts and qualification setting the terms. The German outlet nd-aktuell placed Helsing's order at roughly 4,300 HX-2 aircraft for about 270 million euros. STARK Defence is to supply about 2,200 Virtus systems for the same amount, while Rheinmetall's initial package covers roughly 2,500 FV-014 drones for nearly 300 million euros. Helsing holds the largest unit position of the three, and the Bundeswehr still requires qualification and evidence of performance before further contract calls. The two markets reward opposite disciplines. Ukraine's forces prize fast iteration and direct access to manufacturers; Germany buys against formal milestones. Helsing must satisfy both, delivering thousands of repeatable airframes while preserving the support loop the 59th Brigade praised. ## The June 17 Warhead Agreement The improvement requested by the 59th Brigade points at a supply problem Helsing had already contracted to address. On June 17, 2026, Helsing and EURENCO [signed a Memorandum of Understanding](https://helsing.ai/newsroom/helsing-and-eurenco-sign-partnership-to-deliver-a-sovereign-european-strike-drone-capability?ref=battlepolicy.com) at Eurosatory in Paris to develop a European Modular Explosive Warhead for the HX-2, framed as meeting French operational requirements first. The memorandum does not specify a larger explosive weight, but it sets a specialist energetic-materials supplier on the part of the aircraft Ukrainian operators want changed. Helsing's announcement identified the constraint: global lead times for propellants and explosives had reached 12 to 24 months. The partnership therefore addresses warhead design and access to explosive material together, an industrial response to front-line demand whose schedule is governed by energetics capacity rather than software development. The HX-2 is also moving beyond Europe and Ukraine. Rakuten confirmed in August 2026 that it was helping Helsing pursue a sale to Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force, which was field-testing the drone through the end of September. Neither disclosed a quantity or value. AeroTime values Helsing at $18 billion after a $1.8 billion round in July. ## Japan's Tests Close in September A combat record is now a commercial asset, and every public HX-2 assessment comes from an interested party. Helsing is valued at $18 billion and pursuing Japan. UNITED24 Media is Ukrainian state-backed media. The negative account came from an internal German document that ministry management had neither reviewed nor approved. Those interests do not make the 59th Brigade's 80% estimate false. They make it one crew's estimate, not a fleet-wide rate. The deeper result for European defence technology is already visible: the neo-prime proposition places software at the center of competitive advantage, yet since the HX-2's December 2024 unveiling its public record has turned on launch tolerances, catapults, warhead supply and support response times. Helsing's answers are a 24/7 support line and an explosives partnership. Both are industrial capabilities. Four indicators will show whether those answers scale: 1. Whether the EURENCO memorandum produces a fielded HX-2 warhead, and when, given Helsing's stated 12-to-24-month lead times for propellants and explosives. 2. Whether Ukraine's central military ordering system generates the follow-on purchase of more than 1,000 aircraft that Helsing attributed to the 14th Regiment. 3. Whether Helsing clears Bundeswehr qualification and delivery milestones against its roughly 4,300-unit contract. 4. Whether an assessment independent of both Helsing and Ukrainian state media publishes HX-2 launch and strike rates under jamming.