Garpiya-A1

Russia's second Shahed-type production line — built not at Alabuga but by the Almaz-Antey subsidiary Kupol in Izhevsk, with documented Chinese engineering help. It carries a heavier warhead than a Geran-2, and it is the first of Russia's long-range attack drones to be marketed for export and fielded outside Ukraine.

Overview

The Garpiya-A1 ("Harpy-A1") is a long-range one-way attack drone produced by the Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant "Kupol" (IEMZ Kupol), a subsidiary of the Russian air-defence conglomerate Almaz-Antey. It is a Shahed-136 derivative in configuration and role, but it is a genuinely separate industrial programme from the Geran-2 line at the Alabuga special economic zone in Tatarstan — different plant, different corporate parent, different supply chain, and a different position in Russian export policy.

Three things make it worth tracking apart from the Geran family. Its warhead is substantially heavier: up to 150 kg in the Russian operational version against roughly 50 kg for a standard Geran-2. It has been the leading edge of Russian anti-jam development, fielding a 16-element Kometa-M16 controlled-reception-pattern antenna from early 2026, an upgrade over the 12-element Kometa-M12 seen on the Geran-3. And it is the one Russian long-range strike drone that has left the Ukraine theatre — deployed to Mali in May 2026 and formally marketed for export by Rosoboronexport in August 2026.

Development

IEMZ Kupol acquired a plant in 2020 and established Garpiya production from 2023, using the Iranian Shahed-136 as the design reference. The programme is distinguished from Alabuga's Geran effort by its supply arrangements: Reuters reporting has documented that the Garpiya incorporates engines, parts and technology from China while being assembled in Russia, and that Chinese specialists assisted in developing the Shahed-style airframe — a finding that moved Chinese industrial involvement in Russian strike systems from inference to documentation.

Production scaled quickly. According to figures attributed to the company and reported by Reuters, Kupol built roughly 500 drones in the second half of 2023 and 2,000 in the first half of 2024, with more than 2,500 produced between July 2023 and July 2024. The Institute for Science and International Security's review of Russian Shahed-type deployment against Ukraine treats Garpiya-A1 as a distinct Kupol-manufactured line within the broader Shahed-type inventory.

The programme has attracted direct sanctions attention. The European Union sanctioned suppliers to the Garpiya programme in 2026, naming the drone in Council documentation as developed and produced for use in Russia's war against Ukraine, and pairing it with action against the Bekas supply chain.

Design & capabilities

The Garpiya-A1 is a tailless delta-wing airframe with a piston engine driving a pusher propeller — the Shahed-136 formula. Specifications differ between the export model and the version Russia flies, and both are worth recording separately.

Garpiya-A1(E), the export variant marketed by Rosoboronexport from August 2026:

• Dimensions: 3.4 m fuselage length, 3 m wingspan
• Take-off weight: 250 kg
• Speed: not less than 170 km/h
• Altitude: automatic flight between 50 and 2,500 m
• Endurance: not less than 6 hours
• Range: not less than 1,000 km
• Warhead: over 50 kg
• Accuracy: claimed circular error probable of no more than 4 m — a manufacturer figure, and one that assumes benign electronic conditions

The Russian operational version is reported at higher performance: speeds up to 185 km/h, ranges of 1,500 km and in some accounts 1,500–2,000 km, and a warhead of up to 150 kg. Polish reference material lists a Limbach L-550E-type piston engine of about 50 hp and a take-off weight nearer 300 kg. Treat the 150 kg warhead as the figure that distinguishes the type operationally: it is roughly triple a standard Geran-2 payload and moves the drone from harassment into meaningful structural damage.

The most significant recent change is navigational. From February 2026, recovered Garpiya-A1 airframes have carried a 16-element Kometa-M16 CRPA antenna designed to hold a satellite-navigation fix under active electronic warfare — a step up from the 12-element Kometa-M12 module found on the Geran-3 and on Gerbera decoys. The KK series is the designation associated with this configuration.

Variants

• Garpiya-A1 (baseline): The Russian operational drone as fielded against Ukraine from 2023 — up to 185 km/h, up to 1,500 km, warhead up to 150 kg.
• Garpiya-A1 KK series: The current production standard, identified by the 16-element Kometa-M16 CRPA antenna. First observed in the February 2026 attacks on Odesa.
• Garpiya-A1 KK with airburst warhead: The variant recovered in Mali near Sévaré in May 2026, fuzed to detonate above a target area rather than on impact — an anti-personnel and soft-target configuration rather than a structural one.
• Garpiya-A1(E): The export model launched by Rosoboronexport in August 2026, de-rated against the Russian version at ≥1,000 km range and a >50 kg warhead.

Combat record / operational use

The Garpiya-A1 has been used against Ukraine since 2023 as part of the mixed long-range strike packages that also carry Geran-2, jet Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones, Gerbera and Parodiya decoys. Because Ukrainian Air Force tallies typically report "Shahed-type" totals, Garpiya-specific counts are rarely broken out, and the type's share of nightly volume is not publicly quantified. It appears by name in Ukrainian intelligence production assessments: the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine's August 2026 estimate of Russian output listed Garpiya alongside Geran-1 through Geran-5 and three Gerbera lines in an 11,000-unit monthly production plan.

Odesa and the Black Sea ports have been recurrent targets. The February 2026 Odesa attacks were the first to reveal the Kometa-M16 antenna, indicating that Kupol pushes anti-jam upgrades into the field ahead of, or in parallel with, the Alabuga line.

The Mali deployment in May 2026 is the type's most strategically distinctive event. A recovered airframe near Sévaré was identified as a KK-series Garpiya-A1 with an airburst warhead and the Kometa-M16 antenna — the first documented use of a Russian Shahed-type strike drone matured in Ukraine being exported into an African conflict. Three months later, in August 2026, Rosoboronexport chief Alexander Mikheev announced that the Garpiya-A1(E) was being promoted on world markets, claiming it as the only loitering munition of its class on offer with that range.

Advantages

• Heavier warhead than the Geran-2 — up to 150 kg against roughly 50 kg, giving genuine structural effect against port infrastructure, warehousing and industrial targets rather than harassment.
• Long endurance and range — 1,500 km reported operationally, with over six hours aloft in the export specification, allowing indirect routing around defended corridors.
• Leading anti-jam fit — the 16-element Kometa-M16 CRPA is ahead of the 12-element modules on the Geran-3 and Gerbera, and is the type's clearest technical edge.
• Industrial redundancy — a second Shahed line under a different corporate parent at a different site means a successful Ukrainian strike on Alabuga does not stop Russian long-range drone production.
• Exportable — de-rated to 1,000 km and a 50 kg warhead, the A1(E) is being marketed internationally, giving Russia a combat-proven product in a category with few competitors.
• Cheap relative to effect — a piston airframe with commercial components, produced in the thousands.

Drawbacks / limitations

• Slow — at 170–185 km/h it belongs to the drone generation that Ukrainian interceptor drones learned to kill, which is precisely why Russia moved to jet Gerans. The Garpiya has no speed answer.
• Deep Chinese dependence — engines, parts and technology sourced largely from China, with documented Chinese specialist involvement in development. That is leverage held by a third party.
• Sanctions-exposed supply chain — the EU sanctioned Garpiya suppliers in 2026, and the programme's reliance on imported commercial components is its structural vulnerability.
• Manufacturer accuracy claims are unverified — the ≤4 m CEP in the export brochure assumes no jamming and should not be read as combat performance.
• Specification confusion — export and operational figures diverge substantially (1,000 vs 1,500 km, 50 vs 150 kg), and much of the operational data comes from Russian-language secondary sources.
• Fixed-coordinate attack — no publicly confirmed electro-optical seeker or operator-in-the-loop capability of the kind now fitted to the Geran-4 Seeker.

Counterparts

• Shahed-136 (Iran/Russia) — the design reference and the Alabuga-built sibling line; more numerous, lighter warhead.
• Geran-4 and Geran-5 (Russia) — the jet-powered types now outproducing the piston lines, which the Garpiya does not compete with on speed.
• Gerbera and Parodiya (Russia) — the decoys that screen Garpiya and Geran airframes in mixed packages.
• Shahed-101 and Shahed-107 (Iran) — the smaller Iranian one-way attack drones in the same family tree.
• Liutyi (Ukraine) — the Ukrainian long-range strike drone of directly comparable class and role.

Outlook

The Garpiya-A1's trajectory diverges from the Geran family in a way worth watching. Alabuga is converting to jet propulsion; Kupol is going the other direction — heavier warhead, better antenna, and out to the export market. That suggests a deliberate division of labour inside the Russian strike-drone complex, with the jet Gerans taking the contested, interceptor-defended missions and the piston Garpiya carrying mass and payload on less-defended axes and into export.

The Mali deployment is the leading indicator. It establishes that Russia will place Ukraine-matured strike drones into third-country conflicts, and Rosoboronexport's August 2026 marketing push confirms that intent commercially. For anyone assessing proliferation risk, the Garpiya rather than the Geran is the airframe to track: it is the one with a de-rated export model, a sales pitch and a demonstrated deployment outside Europe.

Two things would change the assessment. A Chinese export-control action against Kupol's engine and component supply would bite harder here than anywhere else in the Russian drone complex, given how thoroughly documented the dependence is. And if the Kometa-M16 migrates from Garpiya down to Gerbera-class decoys the way the M12 did, Ukrainian and NATO electronic-warfare assumptions will need revising across the whole threat set.

Key specifications

Sources

1. Militarnyi — "Russians Used Latest Version of Garpiya-A1 Kamikaze Drone in Mali." https://militarnyi.com/en/news/russians-garpiya-a1-kamikaze-drone-in-mali/
2. Militarnyi — "Russia Attacks Odesa with New Version of Garpiya-A1 Drones." https://militarnyi.com/en/news/russia-attacks-odesa-with-new-garpiya-a1/
3. UNITED24 Media — "Russia Deploys Upgraded Shahed-Type Drones Used in Ukraine to Mali for the First Time." https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/russia-deploys-upgraded-shahed-type-drones-used-in-ukraine-to-mali-for-the-first-time-18965
4. Institute for Science and International Security — "A Comprehensive Analytical Review of Russian Shahed-Type UAVs Deployment Against Ukraine in 2025." https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/a-comprehensive-analytical-review-of-russian-shahed-type-uavs-deployment-against-ukraine-in-2025
5. Ukrainska Pravda / Reuters — "Chinese experts helped Russia develop Shahed-style attack drone." https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/09/25/7532434/
6. The Moscow Times / Reuters — "Russia Using Chinese Engines to Make Attack Drones." https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/09/13/russia-using-chinese-engines-to-make-attack-drones-a86368
7. Defence Blog — "Russia brings Shahed-type drones to Mali conflict." https://defence-blog.com/russia-brings-shahed-type-drones-to-mali-conflict/
8. Council of the European Union — sanctions documentation naming the Garpiya-A1. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5328-2026-INIT/en/pdf
9. Ukrainska Pravda — "Ukrainian intelligence reveals Russia's plans to produce Geran and Gerbera drones." https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/08/10/8048080/
10. GlobalMilitary.net — "IEMZ Kupol Garpiya-A1: Drone Specs, Top Speed & Range." https://www.globalmilitary.net/aircraft/garpiya-a1/

🔒 The Analyst Section on Garpiya-A1 is for BattlePolicy Pro members. Below the line: procurement and contract history, the suppliers and companies behind the system, our head-to-head analyst view of the systems it actually competes with, and the BattlePolicy assessment note. Unlock the full file with BattlePolicy Pro →