Russia's budget law called for a cut in military spending this year. Instead outlays rose 30 percent to a record 43.8 percent of federal spending, and two-thirds of that budget is now hidden.
Ukraine's Bars strike drone is now more than 74% domestically made, and the one part it still buys abroad is the turbojet. A Ukrainian engine has passed final tests. The engine, not the airframe, is what caps output on both sides of the drone war.
The Sept. 8 barrage that ended the envoy pause isolated the one air-defense gap Kyiv now wants American interceptors and European money to close.
European financing and Ukrainian arms production constrain Washington’s ability to impose a bargain, while US weapons, intelligence and commercial services preserve US leverage.
Russia's UMPK-PD is a jet-powered evolution of the UMPK glide-bomb kit, reportedly extending air-launched strike range to 150–200 km while keeping launch aircraft farther from Ukrainian air defenses.
Russia's UMPB D-30SN is a purpose-built, 250 kg-class guided glide bomb designed to strike targets at up to 100 km when released from high altitude.
Russia's RS-28 Sarmat is a heavy, silo-launched intercontinental ballistic missile intended to replace the R-36M2 and carry MIRVs or Avangard glide vehicles, but its operational status remains unverified after repeated test failures and delays.
Russia's R-37M is a very-long-range air-to-air missile designed to threaten fighters, support aircraft and other airborne targets at distances beyond conventional air-combat weapons.
Krasnopol is a Soviet-origin family of 152 mm and 155 mm laser-guided artillery projectiles designed to strike point targets designated by ground observers or reconnaissance drones.
Izdeliye 305, or LMUR, is a Russian helicopter-launched standoff missile with an imaging seeker and two-way datalink, used operationally from Mi-28NM and Ka-52M attack helicopters in Ukraine.
Avangard is Russia's nuclear-capable strategic hypersonic glide vehicle, carried above the atmosphere by a heavy ICBM before manoeuvring toward its target at externally estimated speeds of up to Mach 27.
A daylight naval-drone raid roughly 820 kilometers from Ukrainian-held coast extends Kyiv's Black Sea campaign to Russia's eastern shore and stalls repair work on the terminal that carries Kazakhstan's crude.
A shoulder-fired infrared missile that Russia now launches from helicopters to hunt Ukrainian drones — and bolts to Shahed airframes so the drone can shoot back at the aircraft sent to intercept it.
A 1976 Soviet missile system built to shoot down low-flying jets, now hunting Lancets and Hornets. Its infrared seeker was never designed to find something the size of a quadcopter — which is why Ukraine bolted an electro-optical sight to nine of them.
A 1965 Soviet anti-aircraft gun built to shoot down jets, now one of the cheapest ways Ukraine kills Shahed drones. Sixteen modernised Shilkas funded by a charity recorded their first Shahed shootdowns in December 2025.
A wire-guided missile that requires its operator to hold the crosshair on a tank for the whole flight — up to four kilometres, several seconds, motionless. In a battlefield watched continuously by drones, that is the hardest thing a soldier can be asked to do.
A 1961 shoulder-fired launcher that found a second career nobody designed: its PG-7 shaped-charge warhead is the standard payload on FPV attack drones, which means most drone kills in this war are delivered by RPG ammunition.
The 152 mm half of the Soviet self-propelled artillery pair still fighting on both sides. It outranges and outweighs the Gvozdika, it is the most-destroyed Russian artillery system by one tally, and drones now kill it before it fires.
The amphibious 122 mm howitzer that both armies still fire daily, and that both are losing faster than they can replace. Nearly 90% of Ukraine's pre-war Gvozdika fleet is assessed destroyed — and Russia is stripping the barrels off its own for spares.
A tank designed in 1961, pulled from Siberian storage yards and sent to Ukraine because Russia has run out of newer ones. At least 334 have been destroyed, and the T-62's real significance is as a measure of how far the Russian tank reserve has been drained.
A Kharkiv-built Soviet tank from 1966 that is still the backbone of Ukraine's armoured force in 2026 — kept alive by depot reactivation, Oplot transmissions and anti-drone cages, because Western donations could never replace it at scale.
A ramjet missile that homes on the radar trying to detect it. The Kh-31P is why Ukrainian Patriot crews cannot leave their radars radiating, and why the air-defence problem in Ukraine is as much about emissions discipline as about interceptor stocks.
A 1960s anti-ship missile carrying nearly a tonne of explosive at Mach 4.6, fired at cities it was never designed to hit. Its error is measured in hundreds of metres, which is why its record in Ukraine is a record of civilian casualties.
The precision half of Russia's air-launched arsenal. Where the Kh-22 lands within half a kilometre of where it was aimed, the Kh-59MK2 is credited with metres — and it is the missile Ukrainian air defence reports intercepting one at a time.
Russia's radar-cued hard-kill tank shield, and the first serial Russian active protection system credited with shooting down FPV drones. In its combat debut one tank killed seven drones, then ran out of ammunition and died.
Russia's answer to Starlink is not a jammer. Kalinka listens for the uplink a terminal sends to the satellite and works out where the operator is sitting — turning a communications link into a targeting cue.
North Korea's heavyweight Hwasong-11 — a solid-fuel ballistic missile more than ten metres long, claimed to carry a 2.5-tonne warhead roughly five times an Iskander's, transferred to Russia in 2026 and deployed within range of Ukraine.
A plywood aircraft with no warhead and a metal-coated sphere in the fuselage. The Luneburg lens makes it read on radar as a Shahed, so Ukrainian air defence must treat every one as lethal — which is the entire weapon.
The small Shahed. Half the weight of a Shahed-136 with a third of the warhead and a rotary engine, it entered Russian service as the Geran-1 in 2022 and is still a separately planned production line four years later.
Russia's second Shahed line — built not at Alabuga but by Almaz-Antey subsidiary Kupol in Izhevsk, with Chinese engineering help. Heavier warhead than a Geran-2, now sold abroad by Rosoboronexport and fielded in Mali.
The largest and fastest member of Russia's Geran family — a 6-metre, cruise-missile-shaped "missile-drone" flying at up to 600 km/h with a 90 kg warhead, air-launchable from a Su-25 and reportedly able to carry an air-to-air missile of its own.
Ukraine's long-range drone volume is forcing Russia to halt its own flights, and that is changing the risk calculation for the foreign carriers that still profit from shorter routes across the country.
Ukraine's refinery campaign is converting drone volume into lost Russian fuel, exports and revenue. Moscow's warehouse strikes on Kyiv impose severe civilian costs, but the confirmed damage has yet to expose a comparable economic bottleneck.
Russia first outran Ukraine's cheap drone shield. Now it is blinding the operators, pushing the defense toward onboard guidance and digital links that erode the interceptor's defining cost advantage.
Both sides now aim at the commercial infrastructure that moves the other's goods, and both say so openly: Moscow claimed strikes on three Odesa ports, and drone damage shut Ozon's Ufa warehouse for inspections.
Ukraine's FP-1 drones finished a Tambov warehouse they first struck in July, turning repair for Russian owners from a one-time expense into a recurring cost.
States reached 2026 without starting treaty negotiations on autonomous weapons. Autonomous targeting reached combat on an edge-computing module that U.S. export controls do not cover.
Ukraine can put a Behemoth one-way attack drone over a Russian logistics hub for an estimated $35,000 to $50,000. Europe's newest €6.1 billion buys the costly systems that stop the return fire.
An Nvidia Jetson Orin gave Russia's mass-produced Molniya autonomous terminal targeting, with no radio control link for Ukrainian electronic warfare to jam.
The Aug. 20 barrage on Kyiv killed at least 16 and exposed the gap between Russia's ballistic missile salvos and the Patriot interceptor production needed to stop them.
Ukrainian drones reached Dzerzhinsk overnight and OSINT traced the smoke to the Sverdlov plant, which fills Russian artillery shells and aerial bombs. It is the third reported strike on the site since October.
Russia flew 76 jet-powered Gerans at Ukraine in daylight on Aug. 18. Turbojet drones now reach two-thirds of some waves and roll off Alabuga at about 3,000 a month, faster than the $2,000 interceptors that beat the Shahed. Kyiv's jet-powered answer is still in combat testing.
Ukraine is sustaining its deep-strike tempo against the capital while targeting the civilian logistics network it says supplies Russian drone units at the front.
Callen-Lenz has moved from a rapid UK procurement award to supplying a mass-produced deep-strike drone for the war in Ukraine.
A module Nvidia sells to students and startups turned up as the onboard computer in a low-observable missile built for the Su-57's internal bay.
Ukraine's Aug. 12 strike put Russia's last major Black Sea Fleet base within reach while sparing the Kazakh oil infrastructure Washington had asked Kyiv to protect.
The alliance wants machines to compress the sensor-to-shooter timeline while humans retain control over lethal engagements.
Ukraine's overnight strike reached Russia's relocated Black Sea Fleet base while the reported target set stayed inside Kyiv's agreement with Washington to spare pipeline infrastructure and qualifying non-Russian tankers.
A Vilnius startup measured Moscow's crisis-communication clock for NATO and turned counter-disinformation into a tempo problem the Alliance cannot yet meet. Europe is buying that sensing layer at seed-round prices.
North Korea is supplying the one class of weapon Ukraine can no longer intercept, and Pyongyang collects performance feedback from every Russian launch.
Investors bet $3.4 billion on Monday that cheap interceptor missiles win the counter-drone war. The same week, the Pentagon capped what it will pay for them and funded two rival ways of killing drones.
A disputed strike reached Russia's petrochemical core, and a reported toll of 12 to 13 dead marks the cost of Ukraine's expanding long-range campaign.
Ukraine is containing Russia's cheap drones but failing against ballistic missiles, so Kyiv is attacking the ground network that generates strike mass while it races to build a domestic interceptor.
The Aug. 7 strike extended a three-week campaign that has disabled more than 20% of Russia's largest online retailer's warehouse capacity and prompted Moscow to weigh financial support.
The Aug. 5 barrage destroyed Ukraine's largest automated distribution center and a Nova Poshta sorting hub, as both sides now strike the other's commercial logistics on a dual-use rationale.
Ukrainian operators lose the radio link before impact and the strike lands anyway. Over Edwards Air Force Base, an AI agent flew 27 intercepts on a passive infrared feed. Both ends of the price curve are solving the same problem.
Trump promised Kyiv a licence to build Patriot missiles, then took it back. The reason sits in a depleted US arsenal and a single Alabama factory, not in the president's mood.
HUR's Magura boats have stopped being only anti-ship weapons. Carrying FPV drones, they now put short-range strike aircraft over coastal targets that land-launched drones cannot reach.
Ukraine's $2,000 interceptor drones stop nine in ten Shaheds. Its ballistic defense depends on a Lockheed line building 52 interceptors a month, and Trump has withdrawn the licence that was Kyiv's way around it.
Ukraine's long-range drones are now hitting the inputs to Russia's drone war, while Kyiv intercepted just one of 27 Russian ballistic missiles for lack of Patriot rounds.
Russian units are inserting AI-generated soldiers into drone footage to claim villages they do not hold, and Kremlin-aligned milbloggers say the fake reports are wrecking their own planning.
Bureau 1440's first Rassvet formation can support hour-long links over Ukraine twice a day, according to Militarnyi, but terminals and launch cadence will decide its combat value.
Adversaries are winning with recontextualized real footage and propaganda aimed at the AI answer layer. Western money is still buying deepfake detectors whose accuracy collapses on exactly that content.
Ukraine's mobile fire units are engaging cruise missiles for lack of Patriot interceptors. Hours later, the US Army locked in a seven-year PAC-3 buy worth up to $58.6 billion.
A paper published by NATO's own Command and Control Centre of Excellence names Alliance consensus as Russia's real Baltic target, then proposes a new assessment unit. NATO's procurement agency contracted that capability five months ago.
Ukraine's July 25 Caspian strikes hit the Port Olya 2 and the Begey, two hulls already designated by OFAC and OFSI, on a sea where a 2018 convention bars foreign warships from enforcing anything.
Moscow's mayor claims 390 drones came at the capital region in ten hours; the reported hits cluster on factories, warehouses and power infrastructure.
Overnight strikes on Yaroslavl and Udmurtia landed hours after Zelensky and Ukraine's new command team updated the priority list for a campaign that has flown more than 1,000 missions into Russia this year.
One Kirov factory supplies K-36DM escape seats for Russia's fighter fleet and feeds the Tor missile line. Ukraine reached it with a domestic cruise missile at roughly 1,200 kilometers.
A decade of documented contact, one EU finding of intelligence collusion and a live corruption case establish Russian access and cultivation, not Kremlin financing or command of the party. The variable the whole file turns on is German weapons for Ukraine.
Ukraine's long-range drone campaign has moved from refineries into e-commerce logistics, and Wildberries, Ozon and Yandex Market have all rewritten seller contracts to push the loss onto merchants.
Six days of protests cost Zelensky both his commander-in-chief and his chief of the General Staff. The new command team carries Mykhailo Fedorov's reform agenda without Fedorov, who is still refusing to come back.
Four tankers hit in four days shut the Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal at Novorossiysk, halting roughly 80% of Kazakhstan's crude exports. Most of those barrels belong to Chevron, ExxonMobil and Shell, and Kyiv denies responsibility.
A Russian security-service base ringed by checkpoints, guards and underground shelters was hit by 13 drones, the SBU said, showing what rear-area hardening now buys against Ukraine's mid-range strike fleet.
Operation MoLoChKa has struck 159 Russian vessels since July 6, Moscow is putting soldiers on tanker decks, and European wheat just hit a 17-month high.
A reported fire at the home base of Russia's Tu-95 and Tu-160 fleets, and attack footage showing an unfamiliar V-tail airframe, put Ukraine's deep-strike campaign back on its highest-value target set.
Russia suspended shipping across the Sea of Azov after Ukrainian drones hit 105 vessels in eight days. The blockade was imposed without a single major warship, and the bill is landing on wheat, fuel and the shadow fleet.
Russia can't bomb the factories arming Ukraine, so it targets the will behind them: a 50,000-account bot network, Kremlin money in the AfD, and Germans recruited to spy and set fires.
Volna Kupol Garant ("Wave Dome Guarantor") is Russia's trailer-mounted electronic-warfare complex built to jam Starlink's Ku-band uplink, denying Ukraine's Starlink-guided strike drones their control link across a roughly 20-square-kilometer bubble.
A $50,000 drone flew 2,500 kilometers to Omsk and completed a target list Kyiv worked through for two years. Reach is no longer the problem. What remains is a race between repair crews and strike tempo, and a second front against the tankers that move whatever Russia still refines.
Russia has begun fielding Volna Kupol Garant jammers that blank Starlink over 20 square kilometers, the network most of Ukraine's long-range strike drones fly on, Reuters reports, but the complexes radiate a signature loud enough to become targets.
Fire Point's new FP-1 variant flew roughly 3,000 kilometers to Omsk, closing out the last of Russia's 11 biggest gasoline producers still untouched.
On NATO summit day, Ukraine flew drones 3,000 km to hit Russia's largest refinery and stopped none of 29 ballistic missiles over Kyiv. The split is the war's next phase.
As Russia killed at least 10 people in its second mass strike on Kyiv in a week, Ukraine's long-range drones hit two of Russia's biggest Baltic oil-export terminals and blacked out the Black Sea Fleet's home port, pressing its campaign to choke Moscow's oil revenue.
A new IISS report maps a covert, sea-launched drone campaign against Europe's rear. Brussels answered the same week with a five-project "drone wall" a fraction of the size of the problem it describes.
Kyiv's defenses stopped 90 percent of the cruise missiles and drones in Russia's 11-hour barrage. The ballistic missiles that got through are a delivery problem: interceptors Ukraine already bought have not arrived.
Stripped of its control antenna, the new Molniya runs on a camera and an onboard computer, defeating the jamming that is Ukraine's cheapest and most scalable defense.
Russia's R-330Zh Zhitel is a truck-mounted electronic-warfare station built to detect, direction-find and jam GNSS, satellite-phone, cellular and selected radio communications.
Pole-21 is Russia's distributed R-340RP GNSS-jamming network, built to mount on cell towers and deny GPS, GLONASS, Galileo and BeiDou navigation over protected areas.
Shipovnik-Aero is a Russian truck-mounted electronic-warfare complex built to detect, jam, spoof and reportedly hijack small UAVs, with wider communications-suppression functions.
Divnomorye is a highly secretive Russian ground-based electronic-warfare complex, reported as a strategic successor to Moskva-1 and Krasukha systems with radar- and satellite-jamming roles.
Tobol is Russia's secretive 14Ts227 ground-based space-electronic-warfare system, publicly documented as a satellite-protection complex and reportedly tested against Starlink links in Ukraine.
Kronshtadt Sirius, also called Inokhodets-RU, is Russia's larger twin-engine successor to Orion: a MALE reconnaissance-strike UAV with claimed SATCOM control, 450 kg payload and an uncertain path from prototype to service.
Russian tactical fixed-wing reconnaissance UAV family used for front-line ISR, target acquisition and Lancet strike cueing, with variants ranging from short-range electric airframes to long-endurance hybrid-electric models.
Forpost-R is Russia's indigenized, armed derivative of the Israeli IAI Searcher II UAV, used for reconnaissance, targeting and light precision strike in Ukraine and Syria.
The Shahed-101 is Iran's small one-way-attack drone — the quiet, catapult-launched progenitor of the Shahed-107, used by Hezbollah and Iraqi militias since 2021, confirmed in Ukraine from late 2025 (all-Iranian parts), and refielded in an electric, near-silent variant for Iran's 2026 Gulf strikes.
The Chernika-2 ("Blueberry") is Russia's foam flying-wing strike drone — 3.5 kg warhead, 100 km reach, ~$10k all-in, with Russian-claimed machine-vision navigation that flies under jamming. Over 11,000 claimed built; hitting Kharkiv since June 2025.
The Shahed-107 is Iran's mid-range strike drone reportedly built for Russia's war — announced as a 1,500 km HIMARS hunter, revealed by Ukrainian teardown as a ~300 km, 15 kg-warhead X-tail drone hitting the near rear. The gap between those two descriptions is the story.
The S8000 Banderol is Russia's AliExpress cruise missile — a Kronshtadt-built weapon around a Chinese hobby turbojet, launched from Orion drones: 500 km range, 114 kg warhead, agility Ukrainian intelligence says beats the Kalibr. First used on Kyiv in June 2026.
The V2U is Russia's autonomous AI strike drone — Nvidia Jetson brain, terrain-matching navigation, and late-2025 builds recovered with no radio link at all: nothing to jam. CSIS assesses Russia has likely fielded a fully autonomous weapon in combat. Maker unknown.