Ukraine’s growing arsenal complicates any US bargain with Moscow

European financing and Ukrainian arms production constrain Washington’s ability to impose a bargain, while US weapons, intelligence and commercial services preserve US leverage.

John Ratcliffe’s Aug. 25 Moscow visit revived concern that Washington could trade Ukrainian interests for Russian help on Iran, but Ukraine’s domestic weapons production and European financing make any imposed bargain harder to execute. The European Commission’s June 30 decision to begin disbursing €3.9 billion for drones gives that change a concrete fiscal base, even as American weapons, intelligence and commercial connectivity preserve substantial US leverage.

President Donald Trump confirmed the visit, while Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said Ratcliffe met Russian intelligence officials and not President Vladimir Putin, according to CBS News. Politico, citing anonymous people familiar with the trip and a UK official, said Ratcliffe warned against escalation toward Baltic allies and pressed Moscow to reduce military and economic support for Iran. Trump publicly denied that the trip concerned Iran or Russian efforts to test NATO, CBS said, and described it as semi-routine while pointing to his effort to end the war in Ukraine.

In an Aug. 26 Times Radio interview with Calum Macdonald, former CIA director John Brennan raised a possible exchange involving Russian movement on Iran and a US concession on Ukraine. He was speculating about Ratcliffe’s mission. In a separate interview with Hugo Rifkind, Edward Lucas doubted Washington could exert the same pressure because Ukrainian dependence had changed and Europe was doing more. Lucas still identified targeting information and high-end intelligence as important American contributions. Neither interview establishes that anyone proposed or agreed to a trade.

Ratcliffe’s Aug. 25 visit

Politico’s sourcing supports a narrow reading of Ratcliffe’s mission. Two people familiar with the matter said he warned Russia against escalation toward Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. One of those people and a UK official said he also pressed Moscow to reduce military and economic support for Iran. CBS News separately cited multiple people who described warnings against attacking NATO members and further sanctions connected to Iran and the Strait of Hormuz.

CBS reported that the CIA declined to explain the trip’s purpose and that Peskov subsequently rejected media accounts of the agenda. Neither Politico nor CBS disclosed a US offer concerning Ukraine or a Russian commitment concerning Iran. Brennan’s concern therefore remains a scenario to assess against Ukraine’s military position. Lucas’s confidence depends on how far that position has changed.

The €3.9 billion drone payment

European money now gives Kyiv greater room to sustain domestic procurement without waiting for a single US aid decision. The European Commission said on June 30 that it had begun disbursing €3.9 billion as the first payment within an approximately €6 billion tranche for drones. The larger Ukraine Support Loan allocates €30 billion to budget support and €60 billion to defense across 2026 and 2027. Of the defense component, €28.3 billion is planned for 2026. That figure describes scheduled support, not money already spent.

Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence stated on May 26 that its DOT-Chain Defence marketplace listed almost 800 products from more than 200 Ukrainian manufacturers. Combat units select equipment, while the Defence Procurement Agency DOT contracts, pays and arranges delivery. The ministry put average delivery time at nine days and said an advance-payment mechanism would give qualifying drone manufacturers more working capital. The ministry’s figures describe a procurement model designed to shorten the delay between a unit’s request and factory delivery.

Jacob Funk Kirkegaard’s 2025 Bruegel analysis supplied the historical rationale for financing Ukrainian factories rather than relying primarily on foreign stock donations. European governments had already used the Danish Model to fund production inside Ukraine for Ukrainian forces. Applied at greater scale, that structure converts European credit into local orders and working capital. Ukraine’s ability to equip units consequently depends on a broader group of buyers, although its factories still need imported inputs.

The Kiel Institute’s Aug. 13 update quantifies the counterweight. Its data, covering allocations through June, found that European donors procured at least €3 billion of military aid from US defense companies between January and June. That represented about 30% of European military aid supplied through defense-industry procurement, a narrower category than total European aid. European financing can therefore reduce dependence on US appropriations while continuing to purchase American equipment.

EU procurement exemptions expose a second limit. Euronews reported on Aug. 25 that the Commission had approved exceptions for Chinese-made drone components and US-made Patriot interceptors. France was pressing for time limits on such exceptions, but that was a national position, not an adopted deadline. Vita Holod of Ukraine’s National Academy of Sciences told RFE/RL that neither Ukraine nor Europe could yet replace Chinese suppliers at the required scale, speed and price. RFE/RL identified continuing demand for Chinese motors, batteries and fiber optics inside Ukraine’s expanding drone industry.

Starlink and the strike campaign

Domestic airframes do not remove foreign dependence when their combat use relies on commercial connectivity. In interviews published Aug. 31, a Ukrainian officer using the call sign Jura told WELT that he feared losing Starlink access. He described operators using the service for live video and course correction, with terminals individually registered and authorized for high-speed operations.

Alex, an officer in Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, separately told Business Insider that Starlink was particularly difficult to replace. Business Insider identified both Perennial Autonomy’s US-made Hornet and Ukraine’s FP-2 among drones supported by the service. Their different manufacturing origins matter less at this point in the chain: a foreign and a local airframe can share the same external communications dependency.

The officers’ accounts identify a vulnerability without establishing an impending cutoff. They describe registration rules and geographic permissions affecting particular Ukrainian systems. Decisions by SpaceX over its commercial network are also distinct from Washington’s decisions over government intelligence sharing; dependence on one does not establish who controls the other.

Government intelligence creates a related but distinct dependency. The Council on Foreign Relations’ Sept. 2 overview described the United States as continuing to share critical intelligence that enables Ukraine to strike targets inside Russia. Lucas likewise conceded that American targeting information and high-end intelligence still matter. Lucas’s assessment of greater Ukrainian independence must therefore account for the intelligence and communications needed to use the additional drones effectively.

Patriot before winter

Patriot shows why greater autonomy in one class of weapon does not settle Ukraine’s wider dependence. Federico Mellace, lead analyst for the Kiel Institute’s Ukraine Support Tracker, assessed that Europe currently has limited alternatives to the US system. Euronews’s account of the Commission approving a Patriot procurement exemption illustrates the consequence: European funding still needs access to an American product.

CNN’s Aug. 7 analysis, updated Aug. 13, documented Ukraine’s effort to secure more ballistic-missile interceptors and President Volodymyr Zelensky’s push for licensed co-production. Trump had indicated that Ukrainian co-production might be possible, CNN found, but later emphasized the difficulty of transferring the technology. The co-production dispute shows why funding alone cannot guarantee access to the technology Ukraine wants to manufacture.

Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence has reported increased deliveries of interceptor drones intended to counter Shahed-type aircraft. CNN’s account of Kyiv seeking Patriot supplies concerns a separate requirement: ballistic-missile defense. Expanding counter-drone production therefore does not resolve the shortage described by Zelensky.

This distinction limits any broad claim that domestic production has made Ukraine too independent to pressure. Kyiv can expand its strike capacity while remaining vulnerable in air defense. European donors can pay for Patriot interceptors while depending on US companies and government decisions for supply. Neither condition proves that withholding assistance would force capitulation, but both preserve leverage that drone-production totals alone cannot capture.

The next EU contracts

The balance now depends on execution. The next evidence will come from which contracts the European Commission approves, which suppliers deliver and how quickly Ukrainian units receive equipment. Availability of alternative communications services will show whether Starlink dependence is narrowing. Deliveries of ballistic-missile interceptors, and any permission for co-production, will reveal whether European purchasing power can secure scarce US-controlled capabilities.

The Commission has said subsequent disbursements will extend beyond drones to ammunition, missiles and air-defense systems. Those payments can deepen Ukrainian production and spread procurement across more suppliers. They may also flow to American vendors where Europe lacks substitutes.

Washington consequently faces more constraints than a theory of complete Ukrainian dependence allows, but it retains important influence over particular military supplies and services. The policy test is whether European spending produces substitutes and sustained access, rather than merely financing purchases from US manufacturers. Each future disbursement remains tied to contracts reviewed by the Commission and member states.